The war around Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have once again made not only the price of oil but also the geography of its movement a key issue. Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important energy hubs: in 2024 and the first quarter of 2025, more than a quarter of the world’s maritime oil trade and about a fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption, as well as approximately a fifth of the world’s LNG trade, passed through it. In the spring of 2026, the crisis entered a new phase: Iran effectively blocked the strait, which instantly forced Gulf countries to once again seek land and alternative export routes.
For Israel, this topic is particularly sensitive. Any prolonged disruption in Hormuz changes not only the oil market but also the entire balance of power in the Middle East. When sea routes become unsafe, the significance of those countries that can offer land transit to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or bypass Iranian pressure sharply increases. This is why Syria, despite devastation, sanctions, and years of war, is once again beginning to look not like a periphery but as a potential energy corridor between the Gulf and the Mediterranean.
Why Syria has become important again
Hormuz has shown the main vulnerability of Gulf monarchies
The events of recent weeks have confirmed what has been talked about in the region for decades: dependence on the Strait of Hormuz is a strategic risk. Reuters, citing data and sources, wrote that the current war has already forced Saudi Arabia to more actively redirect oil to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, and Iraq to urgently seek alternative outlets through Turkey, Syria, and Jordan. Moreover, on March 12, the Iraqi oil minister stated that about 200,000 barrels per day are already being transported by trucks through Turkey, Syria, and Jordan because maritime exports through the Gulf have been paralyzed.
This is the main nerve of the current moment. As long as oil and gas go by sea through a narrow and vulnerable passage, Iran retains a tool of pressure not only on its neighbors but also on global markets. Therefore, any land route, even less convenient and more expensive in peacetime, suddenly begins to seem like a politically advantageous insurance policy in wartime.
The Syrian corridor looks old but not outdated
Syria is interesting not because it already has a modern transit hub. On the contrary, its infrastructure is heavily damaged. But the country has something that many others do not: geography. Syria lies between Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and the Mediterranean, which means it can theoretically connect the resources of the Persian Gulf with the European direction. In past decades, important pipeline routes passed through or were planned on Syrian territory, from the old Saudi Tapline to the Iraqi lines to Baniyas and further to the Mediterranean.
It is no coincidence that after the change of power in Damascus, the Syrian leadership began talking about partnerships in energy and electricity with Gulf countries. Reuters reported that Syria is opening its economy to foreign investments and working on energy agreements with Persian Gulf states, and later Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other players indeed entered projects in electricity, ports, and infrastructure restoration. This is not yet a new oil and gas corridor, but it is already laying the groundwork for future transit solutions.
The history of the issue: how the Middle East has been seeking a way around war for decades
From Tapline to Iraqi lines to the Mediterranean
The story began long before the current war. In 1950, the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, the famous Tapline, began operating, stretching from the Saudi coast of the Persian Gulf through Jordan and southern Syria to Sidon in Lebanon on the Mediterranean. For its time, it was a grand project: it allowed oil to be exported to Western markets without bypassing the Arabian Peninsula by sea. But by the 1970s, the line began to operate intermittently, was subject to sabotage, and in the 1980s, it effectively ceased to exist fully.
In parallel, Iraqi routes were also developing. Old pipelines from Kirkuk led to Haifa, Tripoli, and Baniyas, but Arab-Israeli wars, the rivalry between Baghdad and Damascus, and then new conflicts repeatedly broke this map. Brookings researchers and other sources note that the line to Haifa was closed after the 1948 war, and Syrian-Lebanese directions regularly suffered from inter-Arab contradictions. As a result, the Middle East itself has been proving the same thesis for decades: a pipeline is not only engineering but also politics.
The Iran-Iraq war changed export strategy
During the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, it became clear that tankers in the Gulf were also not protected. It was then that Saudi Arabia built its powerful east-west system to Yanbu on the Red Sea to at least partially remove exports from the risk of Hormuz. Reuters now directly writes that this infrastructure, created during the “tanker war” era, has once again become invaluable and allows the kingdom to transfer oil to the Red Sea.
Iraq also tried to find bypass routes. Expert reviews note that in 1985, Baghdad built a pipeline to Saudi Yanbu and later relied on the northern route to Turkish Ceyhan. But these solutions did not become the final answer. Some lines depended on Riyadh, others on Ankara and internal Iraqi instability, and others were vulnerable to wars and sabotage. Therefore, the idea of returning the Syrian direction to the map never completely disappeared; it was simply waiting for a new historical crisis.
Gas came later, but the logic remained the same
With oil, it all started earlier, but then a similar logic appeared with gas. The Arab Gas Pipeline connected Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, and the EIA directly indicates that this route went from Egypt through Jordan to Syria, had a branch to Lebanon, and even envisaged continuation to Turkey. In practice, the project constantly suffered from attacks, instability, and supply shortages, but the very fact of its existence showed that Syria can be a transit country not only for oil but also for gas.
Now this experience is in demand again. In 2025, Reuters reported that Qatar received US approval to supply gas to Syria through Jordan using the existing Arab Gas Pipeline infrastructure to support the Syrian energy system. This is not yet an export mega-corridor from the Gulf to Europe, but it is already a very important signal: old Syrian energy arteries are ceasing to be just a memory from the past and are returning to practical politics. In this context, НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency records not just another regional story, but a turn of the entire Middle Eastern logistics towards land routes.
Why Israel offers itself, but Syria still looks attractive to the Gulf
Israel wants to become part of the new energy map
Israel has long seen itself not only as a consumer or exporter of gas but also as a transit platform. After the “Abraham Accords,” the Israeli company EAPC promoted the idea of a land oil bridge: oil from the Persian Gulf was supposed to come to Eilat on the Red Sea and then go through the existing pipeline to the Mediterranean. Reuters wrote that supporters of the project called this route the shortest and most economically advantageous way for oil supplies from the Gulf to Western markets. And in March 2026, Benjamin Netanyahu openly stated that after the war, Middle Eastern oil and gas should go through pipelines across the Arabian Peninsula to Israeli ports to bypass threats from Iran.
For Israel, this would be a strategic strengthening. Such a scenario would turn the country into an indispensable link between the Gulf and the Mediterranean, thereby increasing its political and economic weight far beyond its own fields. For the Israeli audience, this is an important point: it is not only about business but also about the real growth of the regional significance of the Jewish state.
But for Arab monarchies, the Syrian option is politically more convenient
This is where the main political nuance arises. There are no direct public statements found that Gulf countries “fear dependence on Israel.” But this logically follows from the configuration of interests: if the entire alternative exit from the Persian Gulf is tied to Israeli ports and Israeli infrastructure, Jerusalem automatically gains a huge transit lever. For some Arab regimes, especially in such a nervous regional environment, this is too sensitive a dependence. Such a conclusion is analytical, but it aligns well with the fact that Gulf states are simultaneously investing in Syrian energy, roads, ports, and electricity generation, not just in contacts with Israel.
Therefore, Syria today looks not like a replacement for Israel but as an alternative to excessive dependence on any one point. For Qatar, it is a chance to at least partially escape the Hormuz trap, especially considering that Reuters called Doha perhaps the most vulnerable player in the current crisis due to almost complete LNG export linkage to the strait. For Iraq, it is a land window to the Mediterranean and an opportunity to reduce pressure on southern terminals. For Saudi Arabia, it is a reserve element of a large system where Yanbu already exists, but where diversification remains a matter of security, not just commerce.
In this sense, the current war did not invent a new geography but merely revived the old one. Syria is becoming important again not because stability suddenly appeared there, but because the crisis in Hormuz reminded the entire region: in the Middle East, the winner is not the one who only has more oil, but the one who has a way to export it in times of war.