In Europe, there is talk again about direct contacts with Russia — and this is no longer diplomatic noise amid the war, but a sign of a deeper shift. U.S. policy under Donald Trump increasingly diverges from Europe’s interests, and Washington’s attempts to quickly bring Ukraine and Russia to a ceasefire regime look increasingly vulnerable.
At the end of May in Cyprus, the foreign ministers of the EU countries are to discuss whether the EU should start a separate negotiation track with Moscow and what demands should be made to the Kremlin. The issue is painful: talking to Russia, which continues the war against Ukraine, is dangerous. But pretending that American mediation remains a reliable support is also becoming increasingly difficult for Europe.
Europe seeks its voice: why the topic of negotiations has returned
Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated that it is time for Europe to start talking to Russia. He did not name a specific date or propose a ready-made formula, but the essence of his position is clear: Europeans can no longer fully depend on the American approach to the war if this approach no longer reflects their interests.
Currently, in European capitals, there is discussion about who exactly could make contact with Moscow. It could be a special envoy, a group of leaders, or another format. There is no final decision yet, and this shows the complexity of the moment: Europe understands the need for its own channel but fears creating the impression that the Kremlin is once again gaining the right to dictate terms.
Putin quickly tried to use this pause. After the Moscow parade on May 9, he stated that the EU as a negotiator would suit him if it were former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.
Such a move did not look like a random phrase but as a political trap. Schröder has long been perceived in Europe not as a neutral figure but as a person closely connected with Russian state companies and personally with Putin’s circle. Until May 2022, he chaired the board of directors of Rosneft, and therefore his candidacy immediately caused a sharp reaction.
Why Schröder became an irritant
Ukraine immediately made it clear that such an option is unacceptable. Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Kyiv would not support this candidacy. The head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas, spoke even more harshly: she reminded that Schröder was effectively sitting on both sides of the table, remaining connected with Russian business.
For Israel, this detail is also important. The Israeli audience understands well that a mediator in a war cannot be a person trusted only by the aggressor. In any complex configuration — be it the Middle East, Ukraine, or European security — the negotiator must be acceptable to both sides, otherwise, he turns not into a channel of peace but into a tool of pressure.
That is why Kallas’s words sounded so harsh: if Europe allows Russia to appoint a negotiator on behalf of Europe itself, it will not be diplomacy but capitulation to Kremlin logic.
Trump wanted a truce, but the Kremlin showed the price of illusions
The three-day ‘truce’ associated with May 9 ended at midnight on May 12. It was difficult to call it a real ceasefire. According to Volodymyr Zelensky, there was no calm in the frontline areas and communities.
Donald Trump presented this pause as a chance for further ceasefire. He explained it with the symbolism of Victory Day, reminding that Ukraine also played an important role in World War II. Later, the American president expressed hope that the ceasefire could be extended.
But Putin was not interested in such a scenario. Moreover, the Kremlin disrupted the topic of a large prisoner exchange in the format of 1000 for 1000, which Trump also announced. This was a blow not only to Ukraine but also to the image of the American president himself: Moscow effectively showed that it can use his initiatives but is not obliged to fulfill even minimal expectations.
Statements about the ‘end of the war’ and the reality of the front
After the parade in Moscow, Putin stated that the war was allegedly coming to an end. This phrase quickly spread through the media, but in the same speech, he said something else: Russian troops, according to him, should focus on the task of ‘complete defeat of the enemy.’
That is, the Kremlin simultaneously sells the world a hint of peace and continues the rhetoric of destroying Ukraine. This is precisely the usual Russian tactic: to create a diplomatic fog, buy time, regroup forces, and then accuse the other side of disrupting the process.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, during a visit to Kyiv on May 11, directly said that Putin’s statements about a possible end to the war could be another attempt at deception. If the Kremlin really wanted peace, it could withdraw troops or offer specific negotiations without preconditions.
This assessment is also important for the Middle East. In Israel, they have long known the price of ceasefire regimes that look beautiful on paper but turn into a respite for the enemy’s regrouping on the ground. Therefore, the Ukrainian experience here is read not as a foreign story but as a warning.
In the midst of this discussion, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to the main nerve of the plot: it is not just about negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, but about the crisis of Western mediation, where Europe is forced to decide whether it is ready to act more independently.
If the U.S. steps aside: what scenario remains for Europe
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during a visit to Rome, stated that negotiations between Ukraine and Russia with American mediation have reached a dead end. The last round, according to the material, took place in February in Abu Dhabi. Kyiv later proposed meeting in Istanbul, but the Russians rejected such options.
Then, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov stated that a new round of negotiations makes no sense until Kyiv withdraws troops from Donbas. In fact, Moscow again put forward a condition that means demanding Ukrainian capitulation even before the conversation begins.
This is the main deadlock. Russia calls negotiations not a search for compromise but an attempt to force Ukraine to acknowledge defeat. Any mediator who ignores this difference is already playing on the Kremlin’s side.
Trump, elections, and pressure on Ukraine
The Trump administration needs foreign policy victories before the midterm congressional elections. But quick success on the Ukrainian issue is not materializing. On the contrary, the Russian side demonstrates that it can publicly play along with American initiatives and then destroy them without serious consequences.
The material separately emphasizes that dissatisfaction with Trump’s actions is growing in the U.S. Domestic policy is pressured by prices, the conflict in the Middle East, tensions around Iran, and the feeling that Washington is losing control on several fronts at once.
For Europe, this is a worrying signal. If the U.S. starts pressuring Ukraine for a pretty picture for the elections, Europeans will either have to watch silently or take on a larger share of the responsibility for the continent’s security.
This sounds especially painful after reports of the withdrawal of some American troops from Germany. For Eastern and Northern European countries, such a step is perceived not as a technical decision by the Pentagon but as a question of trust in American security guarantees.
Three scenarios of Stubb
Alexander Stubb believes that a full-fledged peace deal in the war of Russia against Ukraine this year is unlikely. He talks about three possible scenarios: continuation of the war, a truce followed by a peace agreement, or the collapse of one of the sides.
In his assessment, if we talk about the risk of collapse, it is more likely on the side of Russia. This is an important thought because the European discussion is often built around the fear of Russian escalation, but less often around the vulnerability of the Russian system itself.
Ukraine, despite the enormous cost of the war, does not look broken. Moreover, according to The Economist, for the first time in the last three years, the strategic initiative on the battlefield has begun to shift to Ukraine, and the Russian spring offensive, on which Moscow had high hopes, has effectively failed.
This does not mean a quick finale. But it changes the negotiation arithmetic. The stronger the Ukrainian army and the more stable the European support, the fewer chances the Kremlin has to impose a capitulation scenario under the guise of ‘peace.’
For Israel, there is another layer here. Ukraine opposes Russia, which is increasingly connected with Iran — an enemy of both Ukraine and Israel. Therefore, Europe’s ability to maintain pressure on Moscow directly concerns not only Kyiv but also the entire security architecture, including the Middle East.
The final fork looks like this: Europe can wait for Washington to change course again, or it can build its own line — with military support for Ukraine, sanction pressure on Russia, and a clear understanding that negotiations without strength turn into an invitation to blackmail.
Putin wanted to show that he can choose mediators for Europe and put Trump in an awkward position. But in the end, he only accelerated the question that had long been brewing: is Europe capable of speaking to Moscow not with a voice of fear, but with a voice of strength.