In Moscow, it seems that more and more often they are thinking not only about the front but also about how to explain to Russians the possible end of the war against Ukraine. Not peace, not recognition of failure, not a renunciation of aggression — but rather a new packaging of the old Kremlin narrative.
According to publications by world media, it may be about preparing an informational scenario in which even limited territorial results will be presented to Russian society as a “historic victory.” Against this backdrop, The Guardian on June 9, 2026, writes that Putin’s refusal to engage in real negotiations with Volodymyr Zelensky is happening not from a position of strength but against the backdrop of Russia’s military, economic, and political problems.
How the Kremlin might sell Russians a “victorious finale”
At the center of this story is a leak of materials linked to the office of Sergey Kiriyenko, the former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and now one of the key officials in Putin’s administration. It is around such documents that Western journalists discuss the possible Kremlin plan: not to end the war honestly, but to prepare a convenient explanation for the domestic audience.
The logic is clear. If Russia could not destroy Ukraine as a state, take Kyiv, break the Ukrainian army, and impose its conditions on the world, then the criteria for “victory” need to be changed.
According to such a scenario, Russians might be told that the Russian army allegedly proved its exceptional combat capability, Europe “suffered an economic blow,” Ukraine “will soon collapse,” and any captured territories — even if they do not meet the Kremlin’s initial goals — became a huge achievement.
This is not a new tactic for Moscow. Russian propaganda has been working for years not only with facts but with their replacement: defeat was called a “regrouping,” isolation — a “sovereign path,” losses — the “price of a historic mission.”
Why this is important for Israel
For the Israeli audience, this topic does not seem distant. Israel lives in a region where informational warfare has long been part of regular warfare: Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and their associated media networks constantly try to rewrite reality, substitute cause-and-effect relationships, and turn aggression into “resistance.”
That is why the Russian scenario is important not only for Ukraine. It shows how an authoritarian system can prepare society in advance for a change in rhetoric, without acknowledging responsibility and without calling things by their names.
Telegram, censorship, and a unified version of reality
A separate line is the possible pressure on Telegram and other communication channels in Russia. Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, as reported by Ukrainian media, linked restrictions on foreign messengers with preparing Russian society for “unpopular decisions” and an attempt to narrow the information space to a single official version.
There is nothing accidental here.
If the Kremlin really wants to sharply change the explanation of the war, it will need not a discussion but a controlled silence. In such a model, people are not allowed to compare versions, argue with the official line, read alternative sources, and see that the “victory” is too similar to an attempt to hide failure.
According to independent studies of Russian internet control, in 2025–2026, pressure on messengers in the Russian Federation increased: Roskomnadzor restricted calls on Telegram and WhatsApp, and then introduced new measures against VPNs and bypassing blocks.
This is an important detail. Information isolation is needed not only for war. It is also needed for the moment when the authorities want to explain to people why the war “ended,” even though the promised goals were not achieved.
In the midst of such informational noise, the role of independent platforms that do not accept the Kremlin’s logic as the norm is especially noticeable. For the Israeli Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking audience, НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency remains part of this environment: where Russia’s war against Ukraine is considered not as abstract geopolitics, but as a matter of security, memory, responsibility, and the future of the region.
Why “freezing” the front will not be a victory for Putin
One of the possible scenarios discussed by analysts is a ceasefire along the current front line. Not a peace treaty, not a recognized border, not a final settlement, but a de facto dividing line that both sides may not legally recognize.
In this sense, the war may enter a different phase. The massive use of drones is already changing the nature of the front: between positions, an increasingly wide “transparent zone” is emerging, where any movement is visible, tracked, and targeted. Over time, such a zone may indeed become something akin to a demilitarized strip, only created not by diplomats but by the technology of war.
For Ukraine, this would not be an easy victory. The occupied territories remain a pain, millions of people — a trauma, and the threat of a new strike does not disappear.
But for Putin, such an outcome would also not look like a victory if viewed not through television but through facts. The main goal of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, was not a few kilometers of land. Moscow wanted to break Ukrainian statehood, subjugate Kyiv, destroy Ukraine’s political subjectivity, and show the West that borders in Europe can be changed by force.
This did not happen.
Zelensky offers negotiations, Putin evades
Against this backdrop, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly addressed Putin with a proposal for a direct meeting and an end to the war. The Guardian on June 5, 2026, published the full text of Zelensky’s open letter, where the Ukrainian leader speaks of readiness for a personal meeting to end Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Putin, according to Western media reports, continued to evade a direct political decision. Formally, Moscow may talk about “peace,” “conditions,” and “negotiations,” but in practice, the Kremlin maintains strikes on Ukrainian cities, pressure on the front, and attempts to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure.
The Guardian on June 9 also reported on Russia’s problems with fuel infrastructure after Ukrainian strikes on energy facilities. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged “certain problems” with fuel supplies, although Moscow traditionally tried to explain part of the crisis by public panic.
This is no longer the picture of an unpunished empire. This is a war that is returning to the territory of the aggressor — not only in the form of military losses but also in the form of economic disruptions, fear, fatigue, and questions within Russia itself.
What options remain for Moscow
The Kremlin still has several dangerous scenarios. Putin may continue strikes on Ukrainian cities, try again to destroy the energy system before winter, announce a new mobilization, or throw people into assaults for minimal advances.
This does not negate the main point: such options speak not of strength but of the inability to achieve a political result by normal means.
Russia can still harm Ukraine for a long time. It can destroy homes, kill civilians, hit energy, ports, railways, hospitals, and civilian infrastructure. But the longer the war lasts, the harder it is for the Kremlin to explain why the “second army in the world” cannot achieve the goals announced in the first days of the invasion.
That is why the Kremlin may need not a victory, but a story of victory.
For Israel, there is a separate lesson in this. When terrorist, dictatorial, or imperial systems cannot achieve results, they often switch to a struggle for perception: who is to blame, who “stood firm,” who “won,” who “imposed their will.” At such a moment, facts become no less important than missiles, drones, and front lines.
Ukraine is not destroyed. Kyiv has not fallen. The Ukrainian army has not disappeared. Western support, despite crises and political disputes, has not ceased.
And so, if the Kremlin is indeed preparing Russians for a “victorious exit,” it may not be a sign of confidence but an attempt to preemptively hide the main outcome: Putin’s aggression did not achieve its main goal.