Ukraine by 2030: 26 million residents, Europe’s ‘demographic cannibalism’ and the threat of ghost towns

On November 21, 2026, Ukrainian demographer Oleksandr Gladun, Deputy Director of the Ptukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, estimated the population in the territory controlled by Kyiv at the beginning of 2030 to be 25.5–26.8 million people. The average value of his conditional forecast is 26.2 million. It assumes that the territory under Ukraine’s control will not change significantly.

According to the scientist’s estimate, the total demographic losses during the years of full-scale war exceeded 12 million people. The birth rate continues to decline, and a significant portion of young Ukrainians are settling abroad. Particularly alarming prospects are for the destroyed cities of the east and south of the country.

Author: Elena Gunko

NANews — Israel News compared Gladun’s estimates with statistics from the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, research from the Center for Economic Strategy, KSE Institute, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These sources have different methodologies, but they point to a common problem: after the war ends, Ukraine may lack people to restore the economy and entire regions.

Where did the 12 million demographic losses come from

Ukraine by 2030: 26 million residents, Europe's 'demographic cannibalism' and the threat of ghost towns
Ukraine by 2030: 26 million residents, Europe’s ‘demographic cannibalism’ and the threat of ghost towns

Gladun identifies three components: approximately 5.7 million Ukrainians abroad, up to five million residents of temporarily occupied territories, and about 1.3 million natural population decline in 2022–2025.

These figures cannot be added without reservations. People outside state control continue to live, and the liberation of territories or the return of refugees will change the statistics. The number of military and civilian casualties needs to be established separately. Moreover, territorial, migratory, and demographic estimates are not the results of a unified census.

2001 Census: How many residents were in Ukraine before the demographic collapse

The last full-fledged population census of Ukraine was conducted on December 5, 2001. At that time, the country had 48,457,102 people, including residents of Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.

Of these, 32.3 million lived in cities, almost 16 million in rural areas. Women made up 53.7% of the permanent population, men 46.3%.

By nationality, 77.8% of residents identified as Ukrainians, 17.3% as Russians. Ukrainian was considered the native language by 67.5% of the population, Russian by 29.6%. Nationality and native language were considered separately.

The demographic crisis was already noticeable then. According to the 1989 census, Ukraine’s permanent population was 51.45 million people, and by 2001 it was 48.24 million. Over twelve years, the country lost more than 3.2 million residents, or 6.2%.

Thus, the population decline began long before the 2014 war and the full-scale invasion of 2022. Its causes were low birth rates, high mortality, and emigration.

Today, demographers allow that by the beginning of 2030, 25.5–26.8 million residents will remain in the territory controlled by Kyiv. However, this forecast cannot be directly compared with the results of the 2001 census: then the entire territory of Ukraine was considered, and the current estimate does not cover the population of occupied regions.

Meanwhile, the absence of a new full-fledged census for a quarter of a century seriously complicates demographic planning. Ukrainian authorities have to calculate the needs for housing, schools, hospitals, and jobs based on administrative statistics, migration studies, and approximate estimates of the actual population.

Since then, the country has experienced massive labor migration, the occupation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the full-scale invasion of 2022. Currently, about 20% of Ukrainian territory remains under occupation.

Hence the discrepancies. Gladun assumes that at the beginning of 2026, there were slightly more than 27 million residents in the controlled territory. KSE Institute estimates their number at 29.4 million. The difference exceeds two million.

The forecast for 2030 depends on the initial population size, age structure, mortality, birth rates, migration, and changes in the front line. Therefore, the figure of 26 million cannot be perceived as the result of an already known future.

Fewer children are being born. The problem began long before the war

The decline in Ukraine’s population began in the 1990s. Mortality first exceeded birth rates in 1991, and since 1993 the negative trend has become stable.

After the full-scale invasion, the birth rate fell even further.

In 2022, 206,032 births were registered. In 2025, there were 168,778 births with 485,296 deaths. In the first six months of 2026, 73,292 children were born, and 259,853 people died. For every hundred newborns, there were approximately 355 deaths.

In the Donetsk region, the ratio reached 19 deaths per birth, in Kherson 14, in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv six. Meanwhile, young families are massively leaving dangerous areas. The remaining population is aging.

There is a statistical paradox. In 2025, the number of registered deaths was less than the previous year, even though the war continued. This cannot automatically be considered a reduction in the risk of death: the population size being accounted for is changing. In the first half of 2026, the number of deaths rose again.

The consequences of the war are also affecting, not limited to direct losses: chronic diseases, stress, disruptions in treatment. Before the invasion, Ukrainian men already lagged behind men in leading European countries by about 10–14 years in life expectancy, women by 7–10 years.

Now, to pre-war problems, the reduction in the number of potential parents has been added. Even a post-war increase in birth rates will not quickly eliminate the accumulated demographic gap.

Millions of refugees: whom Ukraine risks losing permanently

In February 2026, the Center for Economic Strategy estimated the number of Ukrainian refugees abroad at 5.6 million. Among them, 31% were children, 40% adult women, 29% adult men.

66% of the refugees were of working age, and 56% of all those who left were under 35 years old, including children.

This is a serious loss for a country with a shrinking workforce.

The study showed that 43% of respondents intended to return to Ukraine. Another 36% did not plan to return or considered it unlikely. Almost 80% of potential returnees linked their move with the final end of the war.

But the intention to return cannot be considered an accomplished return.

The Center for Economic Strategy developed three scenarios: the return of 1.3 million people under unfavorable conditions, 1.6 million in the baseline scenario, and 2.2 million with optimistic developments.

Gladun is more cautious. If in 2022–2023 a good result was considered the return of half of the refugees, now he calls 25–30%. The scientist also allows for the return of up to a million Ukrainians after the war.

The differences are explained by methodologies and forecasting conditions.

The longer children study in European schools, and parents work and acquire housing, the more difficult the decision to move becomes. Meanwhile, many Ukrainians with higher education abroad occupy positions below their qualifications. The possibility of professional realization at home remains a potential incentive for return.

The European Union extended temporary protection for Ukrainians until March 4, 2028. This means maintaining the legal protection mechanism, although individual countries are simultaneously developing ways for refugees to transition to other residency grounds.

Gladun uses the expression ‘demographic cannibalism,’ referring to Vlatko Gjorchev from North Macedonia. In his opinion, European countries are interested in keeping young Ukrainian workers.

The economic interest of host countries is understandable, but the assertion of a deliberate policy of depriving Ukraine of its population remains an assessment. European integration of refugees simultaneously provides protection to people who cannot safely return.

After the war, mass emigration from Ukraine may resume

The end of hostilities will not necessarily lead to an immediate population increase.

In October 2026, KSE Institute presented a model assuming an unstable ceasefire after 2027. According to the moderate scenario, in 2028, about 600,000 people may leave Ukraine, while approximately 400,000 may return.

Reasons for possible departure include the reunification of men with families abroad, postponed emigration plans, and fears of a new war. Researchers only expect a return surplus over departures from 2029.

Gladun expects counter-migration flows and does not rule out a small positive balance after the war. But in the long term, he believes the population decline will continue.

For the economy, the consequences are quite measurable.

KSE Institute forecasts a reduction in the civilian workforce from 12.9 million people at the beginning of 2026 to 11.9 million by the end of 2030. This is about 8%.

To ensure the GDP indicators provided for by the economic scenario, productivity per civilian worker must grow by an average of 5.1% annually in 2027–2029. Researchers view this as a necessary pace, not a guaranteed result.

New technologies, professional retraining, employment of veterans, expanding work opportunities for women, the elderly, and people with disabilities will be required.

Empty cities in the east and south: who will the restored housing await

Millions of internally displaced persons remain in Ukraine — people who have left their homes but continue to live within the country.

Gladun speaks of more than four million such citizens. The International Organization for Migration in October 2026 estimated their number at about 3.6 million. The discrepancy requires considering different dates and counting methods.

Many displaced persons have already found work and housing in other regions. Even after the liberation of their native cities, they may remain in their new location.

Hence the painful problem of post-war recovery. Is there a point in building the previous number of houses, schools, and hospitals if the population of the destroyed city has decreased several times? And if residents intend to return, who and on what basis will decide to abandon its restoration?

Gladun warns of the possibility of empty settlements appearing in the liberated territories of the east and south. However, he does not predict the mass emergence of ghost towns in the near future.

The scientist suggests developing medium-sized cities with populations of 250–500 thousand people. In them, jobs can be created, education and healthcare supported with lower transport and infrastructure costs than in megacities. For this, the state will have to stimulate the placement of enterprises outside the largest cities.

A separate example is Kyiv. Due to energy strikes and communal problems, residents of the capital try to temporarily move during the cold months. Determining the scale of such movement is difficult: electricity consumption, transport flows, and other indirect indicators are distorted by shelling, transport disruptions, and remote work.

Not every family that leaves for the winter can be considered lost to the city forever.

What Ukraine can learn from Israel — and why returning alone is not enough

Israel’s experience is interesting because the country has been building a system for receiving and integrating new residents for decades.

In the OECD report from March 2026, Israeli practice is considered among international examples useful for Ukraine. The Jewish Agency, Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, absorption centers help repatriates adapt, learn the language, receive necessary services, and navigate professional life.

Special attention is paid to security. New residents of Israel receive access to multilingual instructions from the Home Front Command on rocket alerts, shelters, and actions during emergencies.

Ukrainian readers should be explained: aliyah is the move to Israel under the Law of Return, and absorption centers, or merkaz klita, help new repatriates in the first months of residence. Ukraine cannot simply transfer this legal system to its refugees.

However, the practical experience of integrating specialists, recognizing qualifications, and providing services in one place is applicable to returning Ukrainians.

There is another significant circumstance. Before the full-scale invasion, about 1.4 million Ukrainian citizens already had residence permits in EU countries, many on labor grounds. People were forced to seek work abroad due to low wages, corruption, and limited professional prospects.

The demographic development strategy of Ukraine until 2040 is approved, but Gladun points to the lack of full-fledged targeted funding during the war.

Population recovery will require not only security. Decent wages, housing, accessible healthcare, education, and trust in the state are necessary. Moreover, support programs for returnees will have to be combined with assistance to citizens who remained in the country and survived the war at home.

Ukraine may receive billions for infrastructure restoration. But when planning a specific destroyed city, it will first be necessary to find out how many former residents actually intend to return, where they plan to work, and whether they are ready to raise children there.

The answers to these questions will determine whether the restored city will become residential again or remain an expensive construction project without a sufficient number of residents.