On April 7, 2026, a text (Ukr.) by Ukrainian Jewish journalist Vitaly Portnikov was published, titled “Israel and Ukraine are doomed to live in the conditions of the logic of countdown.” Its central idea is harsh but understandable to both Israeli and Ukrainian readers: for Israel, the threat did not begin on October 7, 2023, and for Ukraine — on February 24, 2022. According to this logic, the countdown starts at the moment of the state’s birth if the neighboring space initially does not recognize the very right of this state to exist.
In the case of Israel, Portnikov names May 14, 1948, as such a point — the day of the declaration of independence, after which the war with Arab countries almost immediately began. In the case of Ukraine — August 24, 1991, when independence was legally formalized, but in Moscow, it was not perceived as a final reality from the very beginning. Here, one can argue about the wording, but it is difficult to argue with the basic feeling: both Israel and Ukraine have been living for too long not in the logic of a stable world, but in the logic of a deferred threat.
For the Israeli audience, this thesis sounds especially painful because it hits one of the most unpleasant topics of recent years. Even when the army is strong, allies are nearby, and diplomatic structures look impressive, the feeling of strategic temporariness does not disappear. The threat may change in form, but not disappear in essence.
Why after October 7, the debate is no longer about events, but about the foundation
After the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the idea that Israel is entering a new phase of historical pressure has indeed strengthened in Western and Middle Eastern discourse. But Portnikov essentially argues not with the anxiety itself, but with the date of its countdown. He says: the mistake is not that the danger exists, but that many still pretend it appeared only now.
This is an important remark.
Because if the crisis is considered a temporary failure, then temporary solutions are sought: another summit, another operation, another mediator, another package of guarantees. But if the problem is deeper and related to the persistent rejection of the Jewish state by a significant part of the surrounding space, then the question is not only about military victory over the next enemy, but in a more difficult recognition: the security deficit is built into the very structure of the region.
The illusion of strength, the illusion of peace, and the problem of public will
Why documents are not always equal to security
One of the strongest ideas in the text is the idea that true security is determined not only by agreements between states but also by the will of societies. For Israel, this is especially sensitive. On paper, documents can be signed, coalitions built, and deterrence channels established, but if the mass consciousness in neighboring societies does not accept the very fact of Israel’s existence as a norm, such peace remains fragile and temporary.
This is where the old illusion of the “new Middle East,” which many Israeli politicians and intellectuals dreamed of for decades, collapses. Yes, diplomatic breakthroughs are important. Yes, agreements with Arab states change the map of the region. But they do not cancel the main question: has the ordinary person on the other side of the border developed an internal agreement that Israel has the right to be not a temporary episode, but a permanent reality.
Portnikov leads to an unpleasant but understandable conclusion: as long as there is no such agreement, Israel’s security relies on strength, on limited and not always guaranteed partnership with the USA, and on constant readiness for new escalation.
This is not a romantic picture of the future. It’s almost the accounting of survival.
Why Ukraine looks at this almost with the same eyes
The Ukrainian part of this logic is especially important for the Israeli reader. Ukraine also lived too long with the temptation to believe that it is possible to negotiate with the imperial neighbor within the framework of compromises, papers, formulas, temporary truces, and postponed decisions. But reality showed otherwise: if in the neighboring capital the very subjectivity of your state is perceived as a “mistake of history,” the question is only when and how this “mistake” will be attempted to be corrected by force.
That’s why the comparison of Israel and Ukraine is so striking. Both countries exist in zones where the opponent often thinks not in terms of coexistence, but in terms of cancellation. Hence the common feeling of time as a compressed resource: not to relax, not to be late, not to build illusions longer than the strategic situation allows.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this context emphasizes: for Israelis, the Ukrainian experience is important not as a distant European tragedy, but as a mirror. It shows too well what happens when the neighboring political culture does not recognize your statehood not tactically, but fundamentally.
What follows from this for Israel and Ukraine
Living in the logic of threat does not mean becoming it
The most difficult conclusion of this logic is that neither Israel nor Ukraine in the near historical perspective is promised a simple and final solution.
For Israel, the best scenario would remain a Middle East where the right of the Jewish state to exist is recognized not only by the signatures of leaders but also at the level of public consciousness.
For Ukraine — Russia, having abandoned the imperial model and the idea of absorbing neighbors.
But Portnikov directly points out: none of these scenarios now looks close.
So, a harsher formula remains. It is necessary not just to restrain the enemy, but to do it in such a way as not to become its reflection. This is a thought that is especially close to Israeli society after a year and a half of the heaviest war, moral exhaustion, and constant debate about the boundaries of strength, necessity, and self-preservation.
In this sense, Portnikov’s article is important not only as a Ukrainian reflection on Israel. It is important as a reminder that some states live not in an era after history, but within history, where the date of foundation is not the end of the struggle, but its beginning.
And perhaps the most unpleasant, but also the most honest conclusion is precisely this: Israel and Ukraine cannot afford the luxury of political self-deception. When forces remain nearby that see you not as a neighbor, but as a mistake, the question of survival ceases to be a temporary crisis topic and becomes a long discipline for a whole generation.