Ukraine stood firm where most forecasts promised it a quick collapse. Despite pressure on the front, strikes on energy, and Russia’s demographic advantage, a strategic turning point in favor of Moscow never occurred. This is written by Rajan Menon, professor of international relations at the City College of New York and senior research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, in a column for The Guardian.
The main thesis of the expert is that the war, conceived as a quick operation, turned into a protracted attrition for the Kremlin without a clear prospect of victory.
Ukraine refuted early predictions of defeat
At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, many analysts expected Ukraine to fall within a few days. Russia’s population is more than three times that of Ukraine, GDP is about ten times higher, the army is significantly larger, and the arsenal of tanks, artillery, missiles, and aviation is greater.
“The Russian leadership, including Putin, expected the Ukrainians to capitulate, perhaps even to welcome Russian troops,” notes Menon.
Even the US and UK intelligence, which predicted the war itself, forecasted a quick Russian victory.
The reality turned out to be different.
It is estimated that Russian losses have reached 1.2 million people, including more than 200,000 confirmed deaths. Geolocation counts indicate nearly 24,000 units of destroyed, damaged, or captured equipment. These figures have been a shock to observers—and likely to Putin himself.
Winter, energy strikes, and civilian resilience
Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the winter of 2022–2023 left millions of people without light and heat. The winter of 2025–2026 was even harsher—thousands of missiles and drones rained down on cities and power plants.
Ukraine objectively does not have enough air defense systems to fully protect all targets.
Nevertheless, as the expert notes, the same phrase is heard in the country: “We have no choice but to fight if we want to survive.”
This moral factor, according to Menon, became one of the key reasons for the disruption of Russian plans.
Drones and a new type of war
Menon emphasizes that the war on the battlefield has changed. Ukrainian drones deprived the Russian army of the ability to conduct classic large-scale armored breakthroughs.
Maneuverability in conditions of total surveillance and strike drones has become deadly dangerous.
Russian units have adapted: they use small infantry groups, motorcycles, cars, and even pack animals to reduce armored vehicle losses. However, the technological advantage in the field of drones, according to the expert, often remains with Ukraine.
Up to 60–70% of losses in this war are related to drones.
Ukraine also actively uses its own missile developments, including the modified “Dovgy Neptune” and other models, striking Russian command posts, airfields, and oil refineries. According to the publication, the defeats affected almost every second refinery, impacting the fuel market within Russia.
Sea drones and anti-ship missiles forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to relocate its headquarters from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.
In analytical reviews by Nikk News — Israel News | Nikk.Agency it is repeatedly emphasized that technological adaptation has become one of the key factors in the balance of power in this war.
Russia has not captured a single major city after Avdiivka
After taking Avdiivka in February 2024, Russia was unable to capture a single major city. Since 2024, its average daily advance in certain directions has been measured in tens of meters.
In a year, Moscow gained about 1.5% of Ukraine’s territory, losing tens of thousands of people monthly.
To annex the remaining part of Donbas, Russia needs to break through fortifications and storm the agglomeration of Sloviansk — Kramatorsk — Kostyantynivka. This requires resources that the Kremlin has not yet demonstrated.
Putin and the illusion of control
Menon suggests that Putin may understand the discrepancy between the generals’ reports and the real situation. Statements about “advancing along the entire front line” contrast with independent data.
The expert notes that proposals for partial settlement may be related to the realization of limited capabilities.
At the same time, despite societal fatigue, about 75% of Ukrainians, according to polls, reject the scenario of transferring territories to Russia that its army could not capture.
The conclusion of the analysis is as follows: Russia has not formally lost, its economy has not collapsed, military power remains significant. But there is no strategic victory, and the war has turned into an exhausting confrontation with no obvious way out.
This, according to the author, is the main paradox: understanding the limitations of his results, Putin continues a war for which the real chances of success were not initially calculated.