The deal with Iran may not be just about Iran
There is a lot of noise, leaks, contradictory statements, and political smoke surrounding the possible US-Iran deal. On the surface, everything looks familiar: Tehran’s nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions, oil, missiles, Hezbollah, Hamas, Israel’s security.
But if you look more broadly, another question arises: is this deal part of a larger American strategy against China?
For Beijing, Iran has long been not just ‘another country under sanctions.’
It was an energy rear, a source of cheap oil, a land and sea hub in the Middle East, and an important element of the large anti-American alliance China — Russia — Iran. That is why a possible shift of Iran from a closed sanctions regime to a more transparent international field could hit not only Tehran but also the Chinese model of influence.
It is important to clarify immediately: it is not about Iran being ‘bought,’ China already ‘losing,’ and the US reshaping the Middle East with one memorandum. No. The deal has not yet become a final reality. Reuters reported on June 12, 2026, that Trump sharply rejected the Iranian version of the terms of a possible agreement, calling reports of conditions too favorable for Tehran unreliable. According to Reuters, the parties are discussing a memorandum, sanctions, frozen funds, the Strait of Hormuz, and nuclear restrictions, but the final picture remains controversial.
That is why it is more correct to talk not about a completed deal, but about a possible strategic plan.
Chinese oil from Iran: where the main nerve begins
China is the main buyer of Iranian oil. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chinese purchases account for about 90% of exported Iranian oil, and these sales bring Tehran tens of billions of dollars a year. It is also noted that China and Iran signed a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in 2021, including economic, technological, and defense cooperation.
For Beijing, this was a convenient scheme.
Iran was under sanctions, meaning it sold oil cheaper. China could buy it through gray mechanisms, intermediaries, shadow tankers, and schemes that complicated Western control. Tehran received money, Beijing received energy resources at a discount, and the US saw that the sanctions regime was not fully working.
If the possible US-Iran deal indeed returns Iranian oil to a more legal international field, the logic of trade itself changes. Oil becomes more visible to banks, insurers, auditors, traders, and Western regulators. China may still be able to buy Iranian oil, but no longer as an almost exclusive buyer from the gray zone.
This does not mean that Washington is ‘taking oil from China.’ But it may mean something else: the US is trying to make Chinese access to Iranian oil less cheap, less closed, and less politically convenient.
For Israel, this is not an abstract economic detail. Money from Iranian oil is not only Tehran’s budget. It is missiles, drones, proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, military infrastructure in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. If Iran’s financial flows become more transparent, it potentially changes the security field around Israel.
Hormuz as a message to Beijing
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s key energy passages. When Iran threatens Hormuz or actually restricts movement through it, it is not only a blow to the West. It is also a signal to China: your ally can influence global oil.
But now the US is trying to show the opposite.
Reuters reported on June 12, 2026, citing US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, that the US military is helping to move about 7 million barrels of oil per day from the Persian Gulf amid disruptions related to the conflict around Iran. Wright also stated that Iranian oil is not currently flowing through Hormuz, but Washington hopes for the resumption of the flow in case of a diplomatic agreement.
This is an important point. The US demonstrates that it can not only bomb, threaten, or impose sanctions but also administer the energy reality of the region itself. And if Hormuz opens not as a victory for Iran, but as part of an agreement on terms acceptable to Washington, this is already a signal not only to Tehran.
This is a signal to Beijing.
The meaning of this signal is simple: key sea routes should not become tools of Chinese proxies or partners. In the event of a major conflict around Taiwan or elsewhere in Asia, China understands its dependence on sea routes. The Strait of Malacca, Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean — these are not geography from a textbook, but the arteries of the Chinese economy.
Therefore, the American game around Iran can be read as follows: Washington shows that the rules in energy chokepoints will be set not only by the market but also by American military and diplomatic power.
IMEC versus China’s ‘Belt and Road’
There is another layer — routes.
For many years, China has been promoting the ‘One Belt, One Road,’ building an infrastructure network of influence from Asia to Europe, including the Middle East. In this scheme, Iran was an important hub: a country between Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe.
But the US, together with India, Arab partners, Israel, and Europe, is promoting an alternative logic — the India — Middle East — Europe corridor, known as IMEC. The official description of the project speaks of a corridor that should connect trade and infrastructure of three regions — India, the Middle East, and Europe.
For Israel, this topic is especially important. In this architecture, Israel can be not a periphery, but one of the nodes of the new trade system: India — Gulf — Israel — Europe. This is not just economics. This is diplomacy, security, ports, railways, energy, technological chains.
But there is a problem: Iran, Hezbollah, Houthis, and the Russian-Iranian axis make such a route vulnerable. If the region constantly lives in a mode of missiles, blockades, sea attacks, and threats to straits, no corridor works as a normal business project.
Therefore, a possible American attempt to bring Iran out of the ‘besieged fortress’ regime may have not only a nuclear meaning. It may be part of clearing space for routes that compete with China’s ‘Belt and Road.’
NANews Israel News Nikk.Agency considers this topic precisely in the Israeli context: if the Middle East becomes not only a field of war but also a field of new logistics, then Israel gets a chance to strengthen its significance. But if Iran retains missiles, proxies, and nuclear potential, any corridor will remain a beautiful map on paper.
Why the US might want to split the China — Russia — Iran axis
For Washington, the strategic threat is not only China, Russia, and Iran separately. Their alliance is more dangerous.
Russia provides military and political support to the anti-Western camp. Iran provides proxies, missiles, drones, and pressure on Israel. China provides the economy, trade, oil purchases, technology, and diplomatic weight.
If Iran remains fully within this axis, the problem for the US and Israel becomes long-term. Tehran receives money from China, military and political support from Russia, and continues to pressure the region through Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and Shiite groups.
But if the US offers Iran an economic way out of isolation, they can play on the internal contradiction of the Iranian system itself. Not everyone in Iran wants to be a junior partner of China and Russia. Parts of the elite need the economy, investments, access to markets, technological renewal, the ability to sell oil without constant risk.
Here the logic of ‘carrot and stick’ appears.
First, forceful pressure, strikes, blockade, demonstration of control over the sea. Then — a deal, money, sanction relief, international legalization. This is very similar to Trump’s style: not to build a long ideological doctrine, but to press until the other side starts to consider the deal a lesser evil.
However, this does not mean that the scheme will necessarily work.
Where in this version is the dangerous illusion
The weakest part of the optimistic scenario is the belief that Iran can simply be ‘bought.’
The Iranian system is not a company that was offered investments and changed its strategy. There is the IRGC, the ideology of the Islamic revolution, the nuclear program, the missile industry, proxy networks, the memory of the US withdrawal from the previous nuclear deal, and the fear that concessions will be perceived as weakness.
Moreover, China will not disappear from Iran even after a possible deal. It will remain a major buyer, investor, and political partner. Russia will also do everything to keep Tehran in the anti-Western orbit.
There is also an Israeli risk.
If the deal simply unfreezes money, partially lifts sanctions, and gives Iran a respite, but does not destroy the nuclear potential, does not limit missiles, and does not cut off proxy funding, then it will not be a blow to the axis, but a pause before the next war. Israel has already experienced similar situations when Western capitals rejoiced at diplomacy, and Tehran used the time to strengthen its capabilities.
Reuters reported on June 11 that US-Iran negotiations included discussions of billions of dollars of frozen Iranian funds, and the parties continued to exchange messages on the details of the memorandum amid ongoing confrontation.
That is why for Israel the question sounds tough: what exactly does Iran get and what exactly is it obliged to give?
Not to promise. Not to freeze for a while. Not to hide. But to really give.
Israel between chance and threat
For Israel, the possible US-Iran deal has two sides.
In a dangerous scenario, Iran gets money, oil returns to the markets, sanctions are weakened, and nuclear and missile infrastructure is preserved under diplomatic formulations. Then Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and other Iranian proxies get oxygen, and Israel faces an old threat in a new package.
In a favorable scenario, something else happens. Iranian flows become more transparent. China loses part of the exclusive access to Iranian oil. Russia gets a less reliable partner. Hormuz returns under stricter international control. Inside Iran, the conflict between economic pragmatists and military ideologues intensifies. And regional proxies get less freedom for war.
The difference between these two scenarios is huge.
In the first case, the deal is dangerous for Israel. In the second, it can become the beginning of a split in the axis that has been built against the US, Israel, and the West for years.
NANews Israel News Nikk.Agency believes that the Israeli audience should look at this topic not only through the question ‘will Iran be closer to the bomb.’ This is the main question, but not the only one. We need to look more broadly: who controls oil, money, straits, routes, ports, proxies, and future trade corridors.
Because it is there that the new architecture of the Middle East is being decided today.
The main addressee may not be Tehran
If the American strategy really exists in this form, then the Iranian deal is aimed not only at Tehran. Its main hidden addressee may be Beijing.
For many years, China has used Iran as an energy crutch, a sanctions partner, and a Middle Eastern hub of influence. If the US changes the rules and moves Iran from a closed gray zone to a controlled international field, Beijing loses part of its convenient shadow.
But this is still a hypothesis, not a proven finale.
The US may conceive a big game, but Iran may disrupt it. China may adapt. Russia may ignite neighboring fronts. Israel may not accept the deal if it leaves Tehran too many opportunities for a new war.
Therefore, the correct conclusion sounds cautious but tough: a possible US-Iran deal may not be a gift to Tehran, but an attempt to change the rules of the game for China. But for Israel, such a deal makes sense only in one case — if it really weakens the Iranian military machine, and not just buys a beautiful pause before the next explosion.
The question is not whether Iran will smile at the negotiating table.
The question is who will control the money, oil, missiles, and routes after the deal.