Video by Lev Dubinsky with Igor Salikov and Ivan Dolvich from June 11, 2026 — this is not just another conversation about PMC “Wagner”. This is material that directly concerns Israel’s security because it draws a connection between Russian military structures, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the war against Ukraine, and the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
The main question is harsh: could the Russian military and proxy system have been not a bystander, but part of a broader architecture of pressure on Israel?
The answers given in the interview require independent verification. But they cannot be ignored. Too many lines converge at one point: Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Gaza, Russian special forces, former Wagner structures, weapon routes, FPV drones, and the experience of the war against Ukraine.
Who speaks in this video and why it matters
Three people participate in the conversation.
Lev Dubinsky is the host of a YouTube channel, a former senior investigator of the “Russian department” of the Tel Aviv police. For the Israeli audience, this is an important detail: the conversation is conducted not in an abstract political space, but from within the Israeli context, where October 7 is not a topic for geopolitical games, but a national trauma, war, casualties, hostages, destroyed families, and an open wound.
Igor Salikov is presented as a former officer of the Russian GRU special forces and an instructor of PMC “Wagner”. In the interview, he speaks not as an external commentator, but as a person who, according to him, saw part of this system from the inside.
Ivan Dolvich is the co-author of a book about “Wagner”, a person with experience in private military structures, and an analyst who helps explain to the Western audience how Russian “Wagner” differs from a regular private military or security company.
This is what makes the video important. Its value is not that it “closes the question” and provides a ready legal verdict. No. Its significance lies elsewhere: it shows the possible internal logic of the connection between Russian military structures and Middle Eastern terrorist networks.
For Israel, this is fundamental. If Moscow, Tehran, Hezbollah, and Hamas are connected not only politically but also through military specialists, technologies, routes, and combat experience, then the old formula “Russia is a complex but separate player” no longer works.
Russian structures and October 7: what Salikov claims
One of the central episodes of the interview is Igor Salikov’s claim about the preparation of specialists in the spring and summer of 2023.
According to him, even before the Hamas attack on Israel, he encountered signs of activity related to the Middle East, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Homs province, and Sudan. After October 7, these fragments, as Salikov claims, formed for him a picture of possible involvement of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation in preparing groups associated with the attack on Israel.
This is an extremely serious statement.
It’s not just about Russia politically aligning with Iran. And not only about Moscow receiving Hamas delegations or playing against the West in the Middle East. The interview talks about a much more dangerous version: possible involvement of military specialists, preparation, coordination, and presence in combat formations during the October 7 attack.
Such accusations cannot be presented as an established fact without additional evidence. But they cannot be dismissed as mere political rhetoric. If even part of what is said is confirmed, Israel will face a new level of threat.
Because then October 7 will have to be considered not only as a Hamas operation supported by Iran but as part of a broader system where Russian experience in hybrid wars, special operations, and proxy structures could be used against Israeli citizens.
Why this changes the Israeli threat landscape
After October 7, Israel most often talks about three main sources of threat: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. This is correct, but no longer sufficient.
Dubinsky’s video adds a fourth level — Russian.
And this level is especially painful for Russian-speaking Israelis. For many years, part of society tried to separate: “Russia separately, the Middle East separately, Iran separately, Ukraine separately.” But the reality of recent years shows the opposite. Russia’s war against Ukraine, Iran’s strengthening, Houthi attacks, Hezbollah’s actions, and Hamas terror increasingly look not like different crises, but as interconnected elements of one anti-Western and anti-Israeli line.
For Israel, the question is no longer whether someone likes Putin or not. The question is different: can Russian military structures, directly or through proxies, participate in processes that ultimately kill Israelis?
If yes, then this is no longer a diplomatic problem. This is a national security issue.
“Wagner” as a tool of war, cleansing, and state control
A separate important part of the interview is the discussion about the origin of PMC “Wagner”.
Dolvich and Salikov explain that “Wagner” cannot be understood as an analogue of a Western private military company. In the Western model, private military and security companies often operate within a legal framework: guarding objects, escorting, security, contractual tasks. The Russian model, as they describe it, was arranged differently.
“Wagner” is presented not as an independent mercenary business, but as a hybrid tool of the state. It was needed where the Kremlin required force without direct official responsibility.
Salikov and Dolvich say that one of the first tasks of “Wagner” was the elimination of commanders of the so-called “Russian Spring” in Ukraine — people who could become an independent military and political force, uncontrolled by Moscow. This is an important point: in such logic, “Wagner” was created not only for external war but also for control over its own radical field structures.
So it’s not just an “army for Syria” or “mercenaries for Africa”.
It’s a mechanism that could perform tasks of war, killings, cleansing, pressure, covert participation, and political control.
For Israel, this has direct significance. If “Wagner” and related structures were an extension of the Russian state system, then their contacts in the Middle East cannot be dismissed as the private initiative of individual adventurers.
In other words, if people from this environment interacted with Iran, Hezbollah, or other radical forces, the question should be not “what did the mercenaries do?” but “what task was the Russian system solving?”
Ukraine as a testing ground, Iran as a recipient of experience, Israel as the next target
One of the most alarming blocks of the video concerns drones.
Salikov claims that Hezbollah and Iranian army specialists had the opportunity to study the experience of Ukrainians on the battlefield of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The interview separately mentions FPV drones and Russian specialists who were engaged in drone technologies, did not find support within the Russian Federation, and then, according to Salikov, ended up in Iran, where they received laboratories.
This fragment is especially important for the Israeli audience.
The war in Ukraine has become the largest testing ground for modern drone warfare. There, reconnaissance UAVs, strike drones, FPV drones, guidance systems, electronic warfare, new forms of interaction between infantry, artillery, and aerial reconnaissance were tested.
Iran closely watched this war. Russia received Shahed drones from Iran, and Iran gained access to a huge array of combat experience. In such a scheme, the exchange goes not only with hardware but also with knowledge: how to use drones, how to bypass defenses, how to find weak spots, how to cheapen the strike, how to saturate the front with cheap technologies.
Now part of this experience may return against Israel.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this topic as one of the key ones for understanding the new war: the Ukrainian front and the Israeli front are connected not by slogans, but by technologies, opponents, and military practice. What is being tested against Ukraine today may be used against the IDF tomorrow. What is being worked out against Israeli soldiers in the north may be part of the same school of war that Russia, Iran, and their allies have been developing for years.
FPV drones and a new threat to the IDF
The interview states that the appearance of FPV drones in Hezbollah was practically inevitable. Ivan Dolvich emphasizes: Iran does not have many partners who could teach how to work with such weapons, and cooperation with Russian structures, according to him, did not begin in 2023 but has been going on for almost ten years.
For Israel, this is not a theoretical question.
FPV drones change the nature of combat. They are dangerous for infantry, equipment, fortified positions, observation posts, antennas, warehouses, mobile groups, and even individual fighters. They are cheap, fast, flexible, and can be used en masse. An opponent who receives such technology along with combat experience becomes much more dangerous.
If behind the appearance of such capabilities in Hezbollah stands not only Iran but also Russian experience in the war against Ukraine, then Israel faces not a local threat from Lebanon. It faces an international military network where opponents learn from each other faster than politicians can recognize the new reality.
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza: possible weapon routes
In the interview, Salikov talks about the routes of weapon supplies for the Gaza Strip. In this version, Syria, Homs province, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and tunnels into Gaza are mentioned. Representatives of Hamas who were on the territory of Lebanon and visited Syria are also mentioned.
This is an important block because it shows a possible logistical map.
It’s not about random contact and not about a single transfer. According to the version voiced in the interview, there was a system where Syria and Lebanon acted as intermediate zones for supply, coordination, and communication between different participants.
For Israel, Syria has long been not just a neighboring country. It is a territory through which Iran tried to build military infrastructure, transfer weapons to Hezbollah, strengthen its positions, and create additional pressure on Israel.
But if the Russian factor is added to this scheme, the picture becomes even more complicated.
Syria is a space where the interests of Moscow, Tehran, the Assad regime, Hezbollah, Palestinian groups, and various proxy structures intersect. The Russian military presence in Syria for years created an opportunity for Moscow to observe, influence, coordinate, negotiate, and turn a blind eye to what is beneficial at a particular moment.
That is why the question of weapon routes cannot be considered separately from the question of Russia’s political role in the Middle East.
Russia and Iranian proxies: an alliance that was underestimated for too long
Another important thought is voiced in the conversation: the cooperation of Russian structures with Iran and its associated forces did not start yesterday.
Dolvich draws attention to the paradox: Russian military and intelligence officers who once fought against Islamists in the Caucasus, after new orders, were ready to interact with Hezbollah and structures associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The interview even mentions Russian servicemen who wore Hezbollah patches and other Arabic-speaking units associated with the Iranian system.
This is not just a detail for military experts. This is a symptom.
When a state stops distinguishing between terrorism and allies in the anti-Western struggle, it quickly comes to a cynical formula: yesterday’s enemy becomes a partner if it helps to pressure the US, Europe, Ukraine, or Israel.
And here for Israel arises a difficult but necessary conclusion. Russian policy in the Middle East is not neutral. It can be flexible, covert, ambiguous, but its overall vector increasingly coincides with the interests of those who weaken Israel and the West.
Iran receives political protection, military experience, international maneuvering, and a sense that it is not alone from Russia. Russia receives weapons, drones, an anti-Western front, and an additional way to divert the world’s attention from Ukraine from Iran.
And Israel in this construction turns out to be not a bystander, but one of the targets of pressure.
What exactly requires verification
A strong article on this topic should not turn the interview into a final verdict. On the contrary, the more serious the accusations, the more carefully one needs to handle the facts.
The statements of Salikov and Dolvich require verification by journalists, researchers, intelligence services, and international structures.
It is necessary to verify not general emotions, but specifics.
Who exactly could have prepared the groups associated with the October 7 attack? Where did the preparation take place? Which Russian officers or structures could have been involved? What role could former or current GRU connections play? What weapon routes passed through Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and Gaza? Who transferred the experience of working with FPV drones to Iran and Hezbollah? What contacts existed between Russian proxies and Iranian proxies after 2014?
The answers to these questions are important not only for historians and analysts. They are important for the families of Israeli soldiers, for the residents of northern Israel, for the victims of October 7, for politicians who are still trying to talk to Moscow as if nothing has changed.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency believes that the Russian-speaking Israeli audience has the right to know not only who pulled the trigger but also who for years created the conditions, technologies, routes, and political cover for a new war against Israel.
Why this topic is important right now
The video was published on June 11, 2026, but its meaning goes far beyond a single video.
Israel is entering a period where old foreign policy formulas no longer work. You cannot simultaneously talk about the strategic threat of Iran and ignore the Russian-Iranian military rapprochement. You cannot talk about the security of the northern border and not analyze where Hezbollah gets new technologies. You cannot discuss October 7 only as a failure of local intelligence if broader international networks could have been behind the preparation, supply, and training.
There is also another aspect.
For many Israelis, the war in Ukraine remained a “foreign war” for a long time. But if the experience of this war is used by Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas against Israel, then it is no longer foreign. If Russian specialists, technologies, or proxy structures help Israel’s enemies, then the Ukrainian front and the Israeli front become part of one threat map.
This does not mean that Ukraine and Israel can automatically be equated. Each country has its own war, its own pain, its own mistakes, and its own interests. But opponents increasingly intersect. And this can no longer be ignored.
Israel needs new honesty
The main conclusion from the interview with Dubinsky, Salikov, and Dolvich is not that tomorrow we need to announce final conclusions. The main conclusion is that Israel must honestly reassess its understanding of Russia’s role in the Middle East.
If Russia cooperates with Iran, if Russian military or proxy structures are connected with Hezbollah and Hamas, if the experience of the war against Ukraine is used against Israeli soldiers, then relations with Moscow cease to be just a diplomatic topic.
This is already part of the defense doctrine.
After October 7, Israel cannot afford convenient illusions. The threat is not limited to Gaza. It passes through Tehran, Beirut, Damascus, Moscow, the Ukrainian front, drone laboratories, weapon routes, and old intelligence connections.
Lev Dubinsky’s video is important precisely for this reason. It not only makes loud accusations. It shows the possible architecture of a new war against Israel.
Iran provides ideology, money, weapons, and a proxy network. Hamas and Hezbollah operate on the ground. Russian structures, if the information voiced in the interview is confirmed, could provide experience, technologies, logistics, and military expertise.
For Israel, this means one thing: October 7 was not an isolated Palestinian episode. It was part of a broader axis where Ukraine, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, and Israel increasingly find themselves on the same war map.
Link to the video
title – “PMC Wagner and GRU Special Forces: Axis of Terror? Connection with October 7 Revealed! Salikov Dolvich and Lev Dubinsky”
here it is – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aP0tsNFIWQ