Old wounds have been brought back to the stage.
There are disputes that cannot be resolved by shouting.
Ukraine and Poland have once again found themselves near a dangerous line: historical memory, Volyn, UPA, mutual claims, painful symbols, and political statements begin to sound not like a conversation about the past, but as pressure on the present. And this is happening at a time when Ukraine is fighting against the Russian army, and all of Eastern Europe is essentially living in a mode of testing for resilience.
Journalist Vitaly Portnikov said on the air of ‘Espreso’ what many do not want to hear directly: if Ukrainians and Poles start a real quarrel, the consequences could be catastrophic for both countries.
Not just a deterioration of relations.
Not just diplomatic coldness.
But a loss of stability, which Moscow has always enjoyed.
Portnikov reminded: states must look to the future, even if there was much hardship between peoples in the past. Ukrainians and Poles indeed have a painful history. But if this history is turned into a political club, it will hit not only the neighbor — it will hit both.
Polish politics is entering pre-election mode.
The escalation did not arise out of nowhere. In the Polish political scene, preparations for the 2027 parliamentary campaign are already being felt, and some politicians are once again pulling ‘historical’ claims against Ukraine from the past.
It’s a convenient topic.
It’s emotional, loud, understandable to the voter. It can quickly gather attention, show ‘toughness,’ talk about national pride, and not explain complex economic or political decisions. This is how not only Polish politics works — this is how any politics works when it needs a simple enemy and a quick effect.
Particularly noticeable has been the line of Polish President Karol Nawrocki. He promotes a tough approach to historical disputes and essentially ties them to the level of future partnership between Warsaw and Kyiv.
The sharpest example is the reaction to Ukraine’s decision to name one of the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine ‘Heroes of UPA.’ For some Polish elites, this became a reason for a new attack on Kyiv. Even the idea of considering stripping Volodymyr Zelensky of the Order of the White Eagle — Poland’s highest state award, which the Ukrainian president received in 2023 — emerged in the public sphere.
The symbolism turned out to be heavy.
Ukraine is at war.
Poland is helping Ukraine.
And at the same time, within Polish politics, there is a signal: a historical dispute can become a condition for full partnership.
Portnikov warns: when Kyiv and Warsaw quarrel, Moscow wins.
Portnikov’s main thought is harsh but accurate: from the history of Ukraine and Poland, one can draw a common conclusion — when a big quarrel begins between Ukrainians and Poles, their states disappear from the political map or lose freedom.
He reminded of the sequence that cannot be attributed to chance.
First, the Russian Empire advanced on Ukrainian lands. Then Polish territories came under attack. Ukraine lost the chance for stable statehood after 1920. Poland was destroyed as an independent state in 1939. After 1945, Ukraine did not recover as a democratic sovereign country, and Poland found itself in the Soviet camp.
Then liberation also came almost synchronously.
The late 1980s.
The early 1990s.
Ukraine became independent, Poland — free.
This is not just a historical parallel. This is a map of regional security. The fates of Kyiv and Warsaw have moved too often side by side to pretend today that the weakening of Ukraine will not affect Poland.
If Ukraine is broken by Russian aggression, Poland will not become a calm island. It will become the next major line of pressure. Perhaps not immediately. Perhaps not with tanks the next day. But Moscow always returns where it sees weakness, fatigue, and division.
Why this dispute is seen in Israel.
For Israel, this is not a foreign European drama.
Israelis understand well that statehood is not a gift forever. It is protected by the army, alliances, memory, and the ability to distinguish a real enemy from a difficult neighbor in time.
Ukraine is currently defending itself against the Russian army. Israel is defending itself against the terrorist and Iranian axis. Poland, the Baltic countries, and other Eastern European states understand that the Russian threat does not end at the Ukrainian border.
All these are parts of one big picture.
When democratic countries start quarreling among themselves, authoritarian regimes gain space. When allies argue louder than they speak with the enemy, the enemy listens and smiles.
That is why NAnews —Israel News | Nikk.Agency looks at the Ukrainian-Polish escalation not as a local conflict of neighbors, but as an element of overall security. For the Israeli audience, the question here is not only about Volyn, UPA, or Polish domestic politics. The important question is: who wins if Kyiv and Warsaw stop trusting each other?
The answer is obvious.
Moscow.
History should remember, not blackmail.
Ukraine and Poland have already sought a formula for reconciliation. Back in the early 2000s, the presidents of the two countries signed joint statements related to the tragic events in Volyn. In 2023, Ukrainian and Polish church hierarchs signed a message and held a joint service in the spirit of the formula ‘we forgive and ask for forgiveness.’
This was not an attempt to erase the past.
On the contrary.
It was an attempt to keep the memory honest but not allow it to destroy the future. Because the memory of victims and political blackmail are different things. The first requires respect. The second destroys trust.
Today, part of Polish politics is effectively devaluing previous reconciliation work. If each new political escalation returns Kyiv and Warsaw to the point of mutual accusations, then a simple question arises: what declaration will be considered final at all? And will each subsequent campaign become a reason to demand new symbolic concessions from Ukraine again?
Ukraine’s European integration should not become a hostage to old grievances.
It is especially dangerous if historical claims begin to be tied to Ukraine’s European path.
Poland has the right to defend its interests in the EU. This is normal. Any country defends its economy, market, security, transport, agricultural sector, and political influence. But it’s one thing to talk about accession rules, standards, and reforms. Quite another to turn old historical disputes into a lever of pressure on a country that is now holding back the Russian army.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk states that Warsaw will not block the start of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. But at the same time, he makes it clear: there will be no easy path, and Poland will take into account its own benefit and security.
This can be understood.
But here the boundary is important. Modern EU, NATO, economic, and security issues should not be mixed with the emotional politics of the past. Otherwise, European integration turns not into a path to stability but into a field for mutual claims.
Kyiv chooses restraint — and this may be the right choice.
It is important for Ukraine not to break down now.
A loud response to every Polish statement will bring a quick emotional effect, but strategically it will play against Kyiv. This is exactly what those who want to turn Ukrainian-Polish relations into an open political fight are waiting for.
The best response is a cool head.
Cooperation in logistics.
Economy.
Defense.
Working directly with Polish society.
Joint memory projects without ultimatums.
And a firm understanding: real actions against Ukraine need to be answered, but it’s not worth rushing to every historical provocation.
Because Moscow works precisely with such cracks. Russian propaganda does not always create conflict from scratch. More often, it takes real pain, adds poison, amplifies extreme voices, and makes neighbors see each other not as allies but as threats.
Today, the Kremlin benefits from anything that distracts Europe from the main fact: Russia is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine. It destroys cities, kills civilians, threatens neighbors, and tries to return the region to the logic of imperial zones of influence.
If instead of a united position against the aggressor, Kyiv and Warsaw start measuring historical accounts, memory will not win.
Putin’s Russia will win.
The final conclusion here is simple and unpleasant. Ukraine and Poland can argue about the past, but they have no right to let this dispute destroy the future. Because history has already shown: when Ukrainians and Poles stop being allies, Moscow gets a chance to return.
And in 2026, such a chance is too expensive.