On November 17, 2026, the Russian Ministry of Transport reported the suspension of road and rail traffic on the Crimean Bridge after a repeated night attack. Simultaneously, the media had already published footage: the automobile arch and part of the road span collapsed into the Kerch Strait. Only the adjacent railway arch is visible in the photos.
Author: Lev Varshavsky | NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency
From “minor damage” to the suspension of all transportation
The first strike occurred on the night of November 15-16. On satellite images, researchers discovered road damage in two places; part of the arch structure, according to the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW), deviated by about 15 degrees. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the damage minor. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin reported that specialists were assembled for repairs, and at 19:04 on November 16, road traffic was resumed in a reversible mode — cars were allowed alternately in two directions. Rail traffic continued at that time, although some trains were delayed.
At 23:54, the crossing was closed again.
At night, explosions and missile alerts were reported near Kerch. Already in the morning of November 17, the Ministry of Transport confirmed the cessation of train and car traffic and recommended that drivers not approach the bridge. Four passenger trains “Tavria” from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Adler were delayed by 2.5–4 hours; part of the transport flow was directed to the ferry crossing between Kerch and the port of Kavkaz. The Russian department reported that there were preliminarily no casualties directly on the bridge. The Moscow-appointed “head of Crimea” Sergey Aksyonov separately reported two deaths in a drone attack in the Leninsky district of the peninsula — not on the crossing.
Why the arch is not an ordinary road span
The Crimean Bridge, about 19 kilometers long, includes two adjacent 227-meter arches — one for automobiles and one for railways.
The automobile structure weighed about five thousand tons, its height from the base was 45 meters. Almost two hundred large steel elements were assembled on the shore, then the entire structure was delivered by water and lifted onto supports in 2017. It carried a four-lane road. Replacing such a node is incomparably more difficult than a typical beam on a small section of the road.

The comparison with a chicken egg, which withstands pressure well along the axis but cracks from a side impact, conveys only part of the physics. The arch indeed redistributes the load, including through compression; a strong skew can create dangerous bending and twisting forces. But the bridge was not held “exclusively on perfect symmetry”: engineering calculations provide for uneven loads. Without a technical inspection, it is impossible to assert what exactly caused the final collapse.
There is a less obvious detail here. The two arches stand on navigational supports with combined reinforced concrete foundations — grillages, but above them, the automobile and railway structures differ. The fall of one arch does not in itself prove the destruction of the second.
The navigational passage under the arches is designed for 185 meters in width and 35 meters in height. Ships pass through it between the Black Sea and the Azov Sea, including routes to the occupied ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. The media reports that debris blocked the fairway; responsible maritime services have not yet confirmed a complete halt to navigation.
“Flamingo”, Russian logistics, and the Israeli perspective
Former adviser to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Anton Gerashchenko published a video, which he called a recording from the camera of the FP-5 “Flamingo” missile before the strike. Co-founder of its manufacturer Fire Point Denis Shtilerman shared the publication, dedicating the event to the memory of colleagues Andrey and Yuri. This does not replace official confirmation of the number and type of missiles. The Russian Ministry of Transport speaks of drones; monitoring channels — of a combined attack.
The General Staff of Ukraine has not yet published a detailed official report.
The bridge was built after the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014. It was already attacked on October 8, 2022, July 17, 2023, and June 3, 2025, when the SBU reported an underwater explosion of supports. ISW considers the November strike as part of a campaign against military logistics: Russia has two main land routes to Crimea — through the Kerch Bridge and the occupied parts of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. The breakdown of the first burdens the second. We separately analyzed the political context of the occupation in the material about Russian “elections” in Ukrainian cities.
From Israel, it is easy to underestimate the geography: the Kerch Strait connects the Black and Azov Seas, and does not lead to Haifa or Ashdod. No direct impact of the strike on the operation of Israeli ports has been established. But the story is understandable to a country where transport corridors and sea routes are of special importance: a road, a railway, and a ship route pass nearby, and one accident can affect all three.
When traffic will resume, how much the railway part was damaged, and whether ships will be able to pass under the bridge is unknown. On the evening of November 16, Moscow promised a quick repair of “minor” damages. By the morning of the 17th, traffic was already at a standstill, and the automobile arch was not visible in the published footage.