On June 14, 2026, Hamas announced that the day before, on June 13, it had delivered the response of the Palestinian factions to the roadmap for Gaza. The document is related to the implementation of U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan and was prepared by Nikolay Mladenov, the high representative of the Peace Council for Gaza.
Formally, it is about moving to the second stage of the plan: a ceasefire, gradual withdrawal of Israeli troops, the launch of transitional Palestinian governance, and the restoration of the Gaza Strip. But for Israel, the central question remains the same: will Hamas truly be disarmed after October 7, 2023 — or is it again a political formula without real dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure?
Who delivered the response and where was it coordinated
The response was delivered by Hamas on behalf of the Palestinian factions after a series of consultations in Cairo. Representatives of Palestinian groups participated in the negotiations, with Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey acting as mediators.
According to public reports, Nikolay Mladenov’s roadmap became part of an attempt to move the situation in Gaza to the second stage of Trump’s plan. Mladenov himself spoke on this topic at the UN Security Council on May 21, 2026, and by June, the Palestinian factions had formulated a unified response.
What did Hamas write in the response
In Hamas’s statement, it is said that the Palestinian factions approached the roadmap “responsibly and positively.” At the same time, they emphasized that the first stage of Trump’s plan, according to them, is not yet completed.
Among the demands of the Palestinian side are the increase of humanitarian aid supplies to the Gaza Strip, the opening of the Rafah crossing and other checkpoints, the cessation of Israeli military operations, the launch of a recovery program, and the start of work by a Palestinian technocrat committee.
For the Israeli audience, something else is important: in Hamas’s public response, there is no direct agreement to complete disarmament. The organization talks about transitional governance, aid, recovery, and political conditions, but does not pronounce the main formula for Israel — the dismantling of Hamas’s military machine.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views this response as an attempt to shift the conversation from security to a humanitarian-political track. But after the massacre on October 7, Israel cannot afford an agreement where the issue of weapons is left “for later.”
Disarmament of Hamas: the point around which everything is stuck
Last week, Arab and international media reported that the disarmament of Hamas and other groups became the main contentious point in the Cairo negotiations. According to Reuters on June 11, 2026, the Palestinian factions agreed on 14 out of 15 points, with the unresolved issue being weapons.
Palestinian sources also reported that Hamas, for the first time since the start of the war in October 2023, allowed the principle of “restricted access to weapons.” But this does not mean complete disarmament. It is about a formula where weapons are supposedly to be controlled by the Palestinian administration or an agreed transitional government.
For Israel, such a construction is too dangerous. If armed structures associated with Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or other groups remain in Gaza, the sector will not become demilitarized. It will simply receive a new sign, and the terrorist infrastructure may partially remain within local security mechanisms.
What conditions does Hamas put forward
Among the conditions that the Palestinian side associates with the issue of weapons are the arrival of sufficient humanitarian aid to Gaza, the opening of Rafah and other checkpoints, the start of the sector’s recovery, the launch of a Palestinian technocratic committee, and the linking of agreements to the timeline for the withdrawal of Israeli troops.
Separately, there is a demand that future agreements do not deprive the Palestinian people of the right to “armed struggle.” For Israel, this effectively means maintaining the ideological justification for terror, even if part of the weapons is formally placed under the control of a future administration.
Another important point is personal firearms. Hamas is trying to make an exception for it, explaining it as “personal protection” and possible licensing by Palestinian authorities. But after October 7, such a scheme cannot be perceived in Israel as a security guarantee.
Israel demands guarantees, the U.S. seeks results
A senior Hamas representative, Taher al-Nunu, stated that controlling access to weapons through the Palestinian administration or an agreed government is supposedly meant to alleviate the concerns of the parties. According to him, no faction will be able to form armed militias, engage in military training, produce weapons, dig tunnels, or smuggle.
But in Israel, such promises are treated with extreme caution. It is too well known how terrorist groups in Gaza have used periods of calm for years to accumulate rockets, build tunnels, and prepare new attacks.
The U.S., judging by the diplomatic logic of Trump’s plan, is interested in a visible result: moving to the second stage, reducing the intensity of the war, restoring Gaza, and creating a manageable political framework. Israel, however, views the situation through a different lens — the security of the country’s south, the return of hostages, the prevention of another October 7, and the elimination of terrorist potential at its borders.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes: the main dispute now is not about the word “disarmament,” but about its content. For Hamas, this may be restriction, licensing, and transferring control to “its” Palestinian structures. For Israel, it is the complete dismantling of military infrastructure, including weapons, tunnels, command networks, production, training, and smuggling.
What does Hamas’s response mean for Israel
Hamas’s response does not close the question of the second stage, but rather shows where the main fault line lies. The Palestinian factions are ready to talk about recovery, governance, and humanitarian mechanisms, but are not ready to publicly and directly renounce armed force as a tool of pressure.
For Israel, this means that any agreement without a strict control mechanism will be perceived as a temporary pause, not a new reality. The recovery of Gaza cannot proceed separately from demilitarization. Otherwise, international money, equipment, building materials, and transitional structures may again become part of a system that once led to the catastrophe of October 7.
Therefore, Hamas’s response to the Peace Council’s roadmap is not a breakthrough. It is a signal of bargaining. Hamas wants to move to the second stage, receive aid, open checkpoints, launch recovery, and maintain political maneuvering around weapons. Israel, on the other hand, will demand not beautiful formulations, but concrete guarantees: who controls Gaza, who holds the weapons, and can a terrorist organization once again turn the sector into a war platform.