Inside the ‘axis of evil’, where Russia, Iran, and North Korea have tried for years to appear as a unified anti-Western bloc, noticeable reshuffles have begun. And the most unpleasant for the Kremlin is that Russia no longer appears as the main center of power in this structure.
After another round of conflict with the US, it is Tehran that emerges from the situation more confidently than Moscow. For Ukraine, this may seem unexpected, but the weakening of Russia’s role within this group works to our advantage: the less influence the Kremlin has among its own allies, the harder it is for it to turn the war against Ukraine into a common agenda for the anti-Western camp.
Iran looks stronger than Moscow — and this changes the balance
Iran turned out to be the only capital in this bloc that withstood direct military-diplomatic pressure from the US and did not appear weaker afterward. Against the backdrop of Russia, bogged down in the war against Ukraine, Tehran, on the contrary, demonstrates resilience and tries to raise its political price.
Moscow, on the other hand, increasingly looks not like a leader, but like a state forced to cling to old threats, nuclear blackmail, propaganda, and dependence on partners it once tried to lecture.
This is an important shift. For years, Russia has sold itself as the main center of power for anyone who wants to oppose the West. But today, it itself needs Iranian technologies, North Korean ammunition, bypass schemes, and foreign political loyalty.
Why this might be beneficial for Ukraine
For Ukraine, any loss of Russian monopoly within such a bloc matters.
If the Kremlin is no longer perceived as the main player, it is harder for it to impose its agenda on partners. Moscow wants the war against Ukraine to appear as part of a large global confrontation. But when Iran begins to play more independently and confidently, the Russian war no longer appears to all of the Kremlin’s allies as the only topic.
This does not make Iran safe. Quite the opposite. But within the camp hostile to Ukraine and Israel, competition, jealousy, and a struggle for first place emerge.
For Kyiv, this is a window of opportunity. The less unconditional authority Russia has, the harder it is for it to gather weapons, technologies, money, diplomatic gestures, and silent consent around its aggression.
Israel faced a more dangerous regional reality
For Israel, this same situation looks much more alarming.
If Iran emerges from the conflict with the feeling that it withstood the pressure and did not lose, it may strengthen its positions in the Middle East. Tehran can perceive what is happening as proof of its own resilience, and therefore act more harshly through allied structures, political pressure, and proxy groups.
Therefore, it is important for the Israeli audience to look at this topic more broadly. This is not only the Ukrainian war and not only Russian weakness. It is a chain of crises where Ukraine, Israel, the US, Iran, and Russia are much more closely connected than it seems at first glance.
In this context, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views what is happening as a signal of a redistribution of forces: Moscow is weakening, Tehran is trying to take a higher place, and Israel and Ukraine are forced to assess the new reality without illusions.
Why this is unpleasant for the Kremlin
For many years, Russia built the image of a power supposedly capable of dictating terms to both the West and its own partners. But the full-scale war against Ukraine gradually destroyed this image.
The Kremlin spends enormous resources, suffers military and economic losses, depends on supplies of Iranian drones, North Korean shells, and gray schemes. Such dependence poorly matches the claim to the role of leader.
In this situation, Iran may already look at Russia not as a senior partner, but as a weakened ally that itself needs help.
The Kazan Declaration showed the limits of Putin’s influence
A telling example is the final Kazan Declaration after the ASEAN summit. Despite Putin’s personal attempts to achieve a clear position on Ukraine from the participants, the final document did not contain formulations that could be called support for the Kremlin’s version of the war.
Instead of Russian narratives, there remained standard references to the UN Charter and international law. The only thing that can be loosely linked to the Russian-Ukrainian war is a general phrase about the desire to resolve conflicts diplomatically.
For Moscow, this is a weak result.
The Kremlin wanted to get a political symbol and show that a significant part of the world is ready to accept its explanation of aggression against Ukraine. But instead, it received a cautious document without direct support for Russian demands.
Russia’s economy is entering a risk zone
Russia is losing even temporary economic advantages that previously helped the Kremlin maintain the situation.
For the Russian system to receive a serious financial respite, world oil prices would have to rise to about $200 per barrel and stay at that level not for a few days, but at least a year. Such a scenario now looks extremely unlikely.
That is why nervous movements within the Russian financial system become especially indicative. The decision of the Central Bank of Russia on June 19 to lower the key rate by 0.25% looks not like a sign of confidence, but as an attempt to respond to an approaching economic storm.
For Ukraine, this is important because Russia’s war is held not only on missiles, mobilization, and propaganda.
It is held on money. If the financial base begins to crack, it becomes harder for the Kremlin to simultaneously wage war, buy the loyalty of elites, maintain a repressive apparatus, and portray stability to the population.
What this means for us
We see a situation where Russia no longer appears as an unconditional leader even among its own allies. Iran is strengthening, North Korea is bargaining, and the countries of the global South are in no hurry to sign up for the Kremlin’s version of the war against Ukraine.
For Israel, this is an alarming signal due to the strengthening of Iran.
For Ukraine, it is an opportunity. Not an automatic victory and not a quick breakthrough, but an important strategic shift. The more contradictions within the hostile bloc, the weaker Russia’s ability to turn the war against Ukraine into a ‘common war’ of all anti-Western forces.
That is why the current reshuffles need to be read carefully. Behind diplomatic formulations, economic decisions, and changes in balance within this group lies a simple reality: the Kremlin is losing room for maneuver.
And this already works against Russia — and in favor of Ukraine.