An error that became a historic verdict
Not long ago, Vladimir Putin tried to appear as a person who supposedly restores Russia’s status as a great power. In Moscow, for years, they built the image of a leader capable of outplaying the West, pressuring neighbors, interfering in foreign conflicts, and expanding Russian influence from the Caucasus to the Middle East.
But the war against Ukraine turned this image into a trap.
In a fresh analysis by the Wall Street Journal, a question was raised that previously seemed almost impossible: will Putin go down in history as the person who destroyed Russia himself? It’s not just about military losses. Much more important is that the Kremlin underestimated Ukraine, overestimated its own strength, and dragged the country into a conflict that gradually undermines its economy, demography, diplomacy, and internal stability.
For the Israeli audience, this topic does not seem distant. Israel knows well that state power is tested not by loud slogans, but by the ability to endure a long war, maintain allies, support the economy, and not lose strategic sobriety.
Russia is doing worse with this.
How the Kremlin took Ukraine for a ‘weak spot’
The main mistake of Putin, according to Western analysts, was that he believed his own propaganda about Ukraine.
For years, the Kremlin called Ukraine an ‘artificial state,’ denied its political subjectivity, and expected that the country would not withstand a major blow. The Russian authorities, in essence, decided that Ukrainian identity was weak and that Ukrainian society could be quickly broken.
The reality turned out to be the opposite.
Millions of Ukrainians showed their readiness to defend their country, and President Volodymyr Zelensky managed to hold the state and achieve massive support from the West. Even if Russia tries to regain the initiative on certain fronts, the cost of this war has already become destructive for it.
This is where the difference between imperial illusion and living national will manifested itself. Ukraine, which was written off in Moscow, became the main factor capable of changing the future of Russia itself.
Past victories no longer work
For many years, Putin indeed created the impression of a politician who managed to exploit the weakness of the West. The war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea and parts of Donbas in 2014, Russia’s return to the Middle East through the Syrian conflict, support for the Lukashenko regime in Belarus, attempts to strengthen in Africa — all this was presented as evidence of the ‘return of Russian power.’
But these successes turned out to be not a foundation, but a decoration.
After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it became clear that Russian power has strict limits. The army suffers huge losses, the economy increasingly depends on military spending, and Moscow’s diplomatic influence is shrinking. What once looked like an offensive now increasingly resembles an overstrain of the system.
Russia is losing its sphere of influence
Moscow’s positions are weakening not only in Europe.
In the post-Soviet space, Armenia and Azerbaijan are looking more actively towards the West, and Central Asian countries are strengthening ties with China. New transport routes and energy projects are increasingly being built to bypass Russia.
This is especially important: empires rarely collapse in one day. First, roads, gas pipelines, trade connections, and political formats begin to be laid around them without them.
In the Middle East, the situation for the Kremlin has also worsened. Moscow’s ambitions have collided with a new reality where Russian influence is limited, and its ability to be a decisive player looks much weaker than just a few years ago.
For Israel, there is a direct conclusion here. Russia is still dangerous, especially through ties with Iran, propaganda, shadow schemes, and support for anti-Western forces. But its status as a ‘great arbiter’ in the region no longer looks the same.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to this very point: Putin’s model of power turned out to be built not on development, but on pressure, fear, and war. Such a model can work against neighbors for some time, but in the long run, it destroys the very country that decided to live only by imperial revenge.
The war strikes at the very foundation of the Russian state
The hardest blow for Russia is not only sanctions and not only the loss of equipment.
The war has deepened the demographic pit. Hundreds of thousands of men of conscription age have died or been wounded. Hundreds of thousands more have left the country, fleeing mobilization, pressure, and lack of future. Among them are educated, active, professional people who could work for the economy, science, business, and technology.
For the state, this is not just migration. This is a loss of human capital.
At the same time, internal tension is growing. National republics see that their residents are often used as expendable material in someone else’s imperial war. The center demands loyalty but does not offer a future. The longer the war lasts, the stronger the question: why should regions pay for the Kremlin’s ambitions with their people, money, and prospects?
The scenario of collapse no longer looks like fantasy
The Wall Street Journal essentially raises a broader question: the current crisis may become a test for the Russian Federation comparable in scale to the collapse of the USSR.
This does not mean that the collapse will happen tomorrow. But the topic itself has ceased to be marginal. When a country simultaneously loses people, money, allies, external influence, and trust within regions, its stability becomes a matter of time and political error.
On Russia’s western borders now lies a hostile and wary Europe.
To the east is pragmatic China, which will not save Moscow for free.
Inside are elites tied to fear, corruption, and personal loyalty. Such a construction can hold for a long time, but it poorly withstands defeats.
That is why Putin’s dream of a ‘great Russia’ may end in historical irony. He wanted to restore the empire, but launched processes that make its future increasingly fragile.
For Israel, this is also a lesson. In a world where authoritarian regimes are interconnected, the fall or weakening of one player changes the balance of power far beyond its borders. If Russia loses the ability to dictate terms to Ukraine and the West, this is closely watched in Tehran, Damascus, and other places where they are used to testing democratic countries for fatigue.
The end of this story is not yet written.
But it is already clear: the war, conceived as a demonstration of Russian power, has become a test of strength for the Kremlin. And the longer it continues, the clearer the main paradox becomes — Putin wanted to go down in history as a gatherer of lands, but may remain in it as a leader under whom Russia finally lost its status as a great power.