Vladimir Putin’s visit to China became one of the rare foreign trips of the Russian president in almost five years of full-scale war against Ukraine. He arrived in Beijing with a large delegation, loud statements about partnership, and the usual demonstration of closeness with Xi Jinping.
But behind the beautiful picture remained Moscow’s old problem: China is ready to support Russia where it is beneficial to Beijing, but is not in a hurry to pay for Russian political expectations with its own economic concessions.
The main outcome of the meeting was not in the signed agreements, but in what did not happen again. Russia still did not receive a final agreement on the ‘Power of Siberia — 2’ gas pipeline — a project that was supposed to replace the lost European energy direction for Moscow.
Why Beijing is not rushing with ‘Power of Siberia — 2’
At the summit, Putin and Xi confirmed the strategic partnership, talked about friendship, and signed more than 20 agreements, including documents on artificial intelligence and open borders. Formally, the picture looked confident.
But Moscow’s central hope hung again.
We are talking about the ‘Power of Siberia — 2’ project. This gas pipeline was supposed to go from Western Siberia through Mongolia to China and supply up to 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year. It is often compared in scale to the ‘Nord Stream’, which used to be a key route for Russian gas to Europe.
For Russia, this project is important not only as a business. It is a political symbol: to show that after breaking with Europe, Moscow allegedly found a new powerful market in the East.
But China is not in a hurry.
China bargains hard because it can
Experts note: negotiations on ‘Power of Siberia — 2’ have been going on for a long time, but Beijing remains the strong side in this game. China understands that Russia has become much more dependent on the eastern direction after losing a significant part of the European energy market.
Therefore, Beijing does not give Moscow gifts.
The price, contract terms, and long-term obligations remain controversial. Russian representatives after the visit said that the parties are ‘close’ to an agreement, but this is exactly the word Moscow has been saying more than once.
The meaning is simple: China buys Russian resources but wants to buy them on its own terms. And if the political rhetoric speaks of ‘friendship without borders’, then energy negotiations show the boundaries very clearly.
The Strait of Hormuz did not change the balance
Even the tension around the Strait of Hormuz did not make Beijing speed up. The logic of the Chinese side here is pragmatic: short-term risks in the Middle East are not a reason to bind itself with a decade-long energy contract with Russia on unfavorable terms.
For Israel, this moment is also important.
Against the backdrop of war, the Iranian factor, and talks about the security of sea routes, it is clear that China does not make strategic decisions under the influence of one crisis week. It counts money, risks, routes, and future dependence. In this sense, Beijing acts colder and more calculatingly than Moscow expected.
Friendship against the USA — but without extra gifts to Russia
The political part of the visit looked different. In the rhetoric of Putin and Xi, there was a lot of criticism of the USA, albeit not always direct.
Both leaders spoke about opposing ‘unilateral hegemony’. Putin quoted Mao Zedong on ‘American imperialism’, and the meeting itself looked like a demonstration of a common front against Washington.
The context here is especially interesting: shortly before Putin’s visit, US President Donald Trump visited Beijing. One could expect that China would choose a more cautious tone after this. But the opposite happened — the signal to Moscow was warm, and the rhetoric towards the USA remained harsh.
And yet this does not mean that China is ready to follow Russia to the end.
Beijing uses Moscow but does not dissolve in it
China sees Russia as a partner against American pressure, a source of raw materials, and a convenient political ally on the international stage. But Beijing does not want to become a junior participant in the Russian war or pay for Kremlin failures.
That is why the situation looks dual.
At the level of diplomacy — embraces, statements, joint formulas. At the level of money — tough bargaining. At the level of the war against Ukraine — unofficial support for Moscow, but without openly joining the Russian side.
In the middle of this story NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees an important signal for the Israeli audience: China acts not out of emotions and not out of the ideology of ‘anti-American friendship’ alone. It supports Russia exactly as much as it strengthens Beijing’s positions and does not create an excessive price for it.
What this visit means for Ukraine and the war
For Kyiv, the main question after the meeting of Putin and Xi is whether the Chinese line on the war will change. Judging by expert assessments, there was no sharp turn.
In the West, China’s position is often called ‘pro-Russian neutrality’. Formally, Beijing is not a participant in the war. But the purchase of Russian energy resources, the export of semiconductors, and dual-use goods actually help Moscow to hold on.
This is not maximum military support, but also not neutrality in its pure form.
China fills the Russian economy with money through raw materials and simultaneously gives Moscow access to important technological goods. If Beijing completely cut off such support, Russia’s position in the war against Ukraine would become significantly more difficult.
China is satisfied with a situation where Russia neither wins nor loses
One of the key conclusions of experts sounds unpleasant for Ukraine: China may be satisfied with a protracted state of war, in which Russia does not suffer a complete defeat but also does not achieve a quick victory.
Such a scenario distracts the West, depletes the resources of the USA and Europe, increases Moscow’s dependence on Beijing, and leaves China in the role of a cautious but influential player.
If the situation for Russia begins to deteriorate sharply, China may increase support for Moscow. Not necessarily openly and loudly. Perhaps — through the economy, technology, logistics, and diplomatic constructions.
For Israel, this is also not an abstract topic. The longer Russia’s war against Ukraine remains part of the global confrontation, the more it is linked with other fronts — Iran, the Middle East, American politics, sanctions, energy, and the security of allies.
Ukrainian view: actions of Russia will be judged
In Kyiv, the outcome of the visit is assessed primarily through the future actions of Moscow. Ukrainian orientalist Natalia Plaksienko-Butyrskaya believes that Russia’s dependence on China is only growing, and real results of negotiations could have been achieved not in front of cameras, but behind closed doors.
According to her logic, if a new escalation follows the meeting, it will mean that Putin received enough political air to continue the war.
She also does not expect China to pressure Russia for a quick end to the aggression. Rather, Beijing will become more active when Moscow itself is ready for negotiations — including under the pressure of Ukrainian strikes and internal constraints.
That is, China may come not as an honest mediator, but as a force that will help Russia formalize an exit from the war on more convenient terms for Moscow.
The main conclusion after Beijing
Putin’s visit to Xi showed not the strength of Russia, but the limits of its maneuver.
Moscow can demonstrate friendship with China, sign documents, and talk about a new world order. But when it comes to the price of gas, long-term contracts, and real commitments, Beijing behaves like a senior partner who does not intend to save the Kremlin at its own expense.
For Ukraine, this means that China is likely to continue playing a double game: not letting Russia lose too quickly, but also not becoming an open participant in the war.
For Israel, there is a broader lesson here. Alliances of authoritarian states often look monolithic only on posters. Inside them, there is always calculation, price, and dependence. Today, Russia speaks louder about friendship with China, but it is this friendship that shows how much Moscow has lost its independence after the war against Ukraine.